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THE VORACIOUS FIRST AMENDMENT:
ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN THE CONTEXT
OF 2012 AND BEYOND
Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein*
Supreme Court jurisprudence often privileges certain
constitutional provisions to the detriment of others. Following World
War II, the Court’s elevation of the equal protection doctrine drove
decisions that limited the rights of states and individuals. Over the last
twenty years, however, the First Amendment—particularly the Free
Speech Clause—has knocked equal protection from its perch.
This Article analyzes United States v. Alvarez and Knox v.
Service Employees International Union by critiquing the Court’s
opinions, comparing these opinions to other contemporaneously
decided cases, and situating the cases within the larger doctrinal field
of the First Amendment. In doing so, this Article illustrates the Court’s
systematic advancement of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
The Article highlights the occasionally inconsistent rationales behind
the ascendance of the Free Speech Clause and emphasizes the cost of
that ascendance to other societal and constitutional values, including
labor rights, military interests, and even other clauses within the First
Amendment. The Article concludes by underscoring the modern
jurisprudential driving force of the First Amendment.

* Vikram David Amar is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
Univ. of California at UC Davis School of Law. Alan Brownstein is Professor of Law and holds
the Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and Equality, UC Davis
School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court cases can be analyzed and understood in many
different ways. Often it is helpful to examine a case on its own terms,
within its own four corners, to see whether the assumptions are
sound, the reasoning is solid, and the result is tenable. At other times,
it is interesting to look at a case in relation to seemingly unrelated yet
roughly contemporaneous cases to compare methodological
similarities and possible inconsistencies. In yet other situations, to
make useful sense of a case (or a group of related cases), one must
pull back the lens and ask what the cases can tell us about the larger
doctrinal field—its ascendancy or its marginalization—of which they
are a part.
In our Article for this Supreme Court issue, we examine two
First Amendment speech cases from the 2011–2012 Term from each
of these perspectives. In particular, we take up United States v.
Alvarez1 and Knox v. Service Employees International Union.2 After
describing and dissecting each of the two rulings and the various
positions the Justices asserted in them, we compare the opinions in
these cases to some of the other landmark rulings of the last few
years whose reasoning seems connected to Knox and Alvarez, even
though these other cases fall outside the First Amendment. We then
situate Knox and Alvarez in the larger pattern of ascendancy of First
Amendment doctrine and values over the last few decades;
specifically, we analyze the ways in which expressive autonomy now
seems regularly to trump competing constitutional and societal
values that have traditionally been given great weight—somewhat in
the same way that equal protection reasoning seemed to dominate
constitutional analysis and balancing in the previous generation.
A. Alvarez
Let us begin with United States v. Alvarez, the First Amendment
case from last Term that seemed to garner the most headlines.
Alvarez involved a constitutional challenge to a federal conviction

1. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
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under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 (SVA or “Act”).3 The SVA
makes it a crime for a person to “falsely represent[] himself or
herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration
or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United
States.”4 The Act authorizes an enhanced criminal penalty “if a
decoration or medal involved in an offense . . . is a Congressional
Medal of Honor.”5 Xavier Alvarez, a board member of a local water
district in Southern California, began his remarks at a public meeting
by saying: “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year
2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor.
I got wounded many times by the same guy.”6 These factual
assertions were false.7 Alvarez had not received any military
decoration, much less the Medal of Honor. He had never even served
in the Marines.8
Alvarez was indicted and challenged his indictment on the
ground that the Act violated the First Amendment.9 The federal
district court rejected his challenge, after which he pleaded guilty to
one count, reserving his right to reassert his First Amendment
argument on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the Act unconstitutional. Over the
dissenting votes of seven judges, the Ninth Circuit denied en banc
review, and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.10
The High Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of
Alvarez’s conviction but could not generate a majority opinion or
rationale for doing so; Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor. Justice Breyer penned a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Kagan, and Justice Alito wrote a dissent joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. The Court thus broke down 4–2–3, with six
Justices siding with Mr. Alvarez.11

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
(2012).
9.
10.
11.

18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2542.
Id.
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2541.
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion began by pointing out that
the SVA is a “content-based” law, insofar as its prohibitions turn on
the specific content (i.e., lies about military decorations) of a
person’s communications, and that content-based laws are usually
subject to “exacting” judicial scrutiny.12 Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that various categories of unprotected or lesserprotected speech, such as threats, fighting words, or incitement, are
defined by their content but may nonetheless be regulated by
legislatures under a more lenient level of judicial review. He insisted,
however, that there is no general category of “false statements” of
fact that receives less than full First Amendment protection.13
Indeed, the plurality reaffirmed that aside from the aforementioned
list of limited exceptions, all content-based regulations are
“presumed invalid” and reminded that the “Court has [in the past]
rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First
Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits.’”14
Justice Kennedy conceded that some prior cases used language
suggesting that false factual statements may fall outside the scope of
the First Amendment.15 But Justice Kennedy reasoned that these
prior opinions had really involved a narrower set of circumstances:
when false speech caused or was likely to cause cognizable harm to
persons other than the speaker—as in the context of defamation or
fraud—the Court might treat falsity as a factor weighing in favor of
government latitude to regulate such speech.16 But such “legally
cognizable harm” to other persons (and, thus, such latitude) was not
present here; Mr. Alvarez’s knowingly false statements were not
made “to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to
privileges reserved for those who had earned military decorations.”17
Even federal statutes punishing false statements made to government
officials, laws punishing perjury, and prohibitions against false
representations that one is speaking on behalf of the government,
Justice Kennedy said, involve discrete and identifiable harms—such
12. Id. at 2543–44.
13. Id. at 2544.
14. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (alterations in
original)).
15. Id. at 2545.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2542.
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as damaging the integrity of judicial, investigatory, and other
governmental processes; increasing the risk of mistaken court
judgments; and undermining the “general good repute and dignity
of . . . government . . . service itself.”18 However, the existence of
these laws could not support the blanket proposition that “false
speech should be in a general category that is presumptively
unprotected.”19
Indeed, Justice Kennedy pointed out, if government could
regulate false statements free of constitutional constraint simply
because they are false, then government could prohibit a wide range
of communications—“whether shouted from the rooftops or made in
a barely audible whisper”—on a broad list of topics.20 “That
governmental power,” he asserted, “has no clear limiting
principle.”21
Applying strict scrutiny to the content-based Act, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the statute was unnecessary to protect the
integrity of federally conferred medals (even if that goal is an
overriding or compelling governmental objective) because the
constitutionally preferred remedy for bad, false speech is good, true
speech.22 In the case of the SVA, for example, private people and the
government alike can, with their own speech, expose those who lie
about earning military medals as the scoundrels they are.23
Importantly, as Justice Kennedy explained, a “Government-created
[and presumably publicly accessible] database could list” Medal of
Honor recipients.24 To the extent that such counterspeech would be
ineffective because “some military records have been lost,” the
plurality reasoned, criminal prosecution would also be ineffective,
since prosecution without “verifiable records . . . would be more
difficult . . . . So, in cases where public refutation will not serve the
Government’s interest, the Act will not either.”25 Since there are less
restrictive means than criminally prosecuting liars to accomplish the

18. Id. at 2546 (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943) (alteration in
original)).
19. Id. at 2546–47.
20. Id. at 2547.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2550–51.
23. Id. at 2549–50.
24. Id. at 2551.
25. Id. at 2550.
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government’s interest of preserving the integrity of military honors,
the SVA failed strict scrutiny.26
Justice Breyer’s concurrence was far less conventional than
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Breyer never mentioned, let alone
emphasized, that the Act was content-based. Instead, his opinion was
written as if there were no formal free speech doctrine currently in
use that constrains judges’ assessments of free speech claims.
Without recognizing any doctrinal categories, he observed that courts
in free speech cases generally consider the interests of the speaker in
freely communicating a message, the justifications that the
government advances for impairing freedom of speech, and the
alternatives available to the government to accomplish its goals.27
Sometimes, after considering all of these factors, judicial review
requires either a near-automatic invalidation of a law (under strict
scrutiny), a near-automatic upholding of the law (under minimum
rationality/“rational basis review”), or some form of proportionality
analysis or intermediate level scrutiny.28
According to Justice Breyer and his free-form balancing
approach, the SVA should receive intermediate scrutiny because (1)
the harm to speakers here (i.e., the extent to which the Act creates a
“chilling effect” inhibiting valuable speech) is limited insofar as the
veracity of the speech in question—the factual assertion that the
speaker has received a military decoration—is easily verifiable and
does not involve contested matters of philosophy, religion, history,
politics, or the like; (2) false assertions of fact contribute less to the
marketplace of ideas than do true assertions of fact; and (3)
government often has a good reason to prohibit false assertions of
fact.29
Although intermediate scrutiny is not “strict,” neither is it
toothless, and Justice Breyer concluded that the Act could not
survive this standard of review.30 In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Breyer expressed concern about the statute’s breadth and
recommended the enactment of a more finely tailored statute,

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
See id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2551–52.
Id. at 2552.
Id. at 2556.
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perhaps one that required specific proof of harm to others or at least
a particular likelihood of harm.31
Justice Alito’s dissent began, naturally enough, from doctrinal
pole directly opposite from that of the plurality.32 The dissent (like
the concurrence) barely mentioned that the Act is content
discriminatory; instead, what was essential to Justice Alito was that
the statute was limited to knowingly false statements of facts, lies
about facts that are directly within the speaker’s personal
knowledge.33 Such lies, the dissent argued, have no value and are
thus not protected by the First Amendment.34 Therefore, the Act, in
Justice Alito’s view, should easily be upheld as constitutional.35
What about other possible statutes that might regulate other
kinds of lies in ways, and to an extent, that would have more
problematic consequences? Justice Alito recognized that government
prohibitions of some lies might also “chill” and suppress protected
speech that is not false.36 In such cases, he said the Court should
review the prohibition rigorously, even though lies have no First
Amendment value themselves, for prophylactic reasons—that is,
because of the law’s impact on protected speech.37
Finally, the dissent responded to the “slippery slope” concern
that if lies are treated as unprotected speech, the government might
prohibit lying on an endless list of subjects—such as lying about
college records, achievement or prowess in the arts or athletics, etc.38
The dissent argued that such legislative abuses would be unlikely to
occur and in any case would be corrected by the political process:
“The safeguard against such laws is democracy, not the First
Amendment. Not every foolish law is unconstitutional.”39
One overriding problem with all three of the opinions that were
issued in Alvarez is that they do not really provide a clear answer to
the key question that the case presented: How should the First
Amendment treat factual lies?40 Certainly, if we look at the Justices’
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 2553–56.
See id. at 2556–57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2557.
Id.
Id. at 2563–64.
See id.
Id. at 2565.
Id.
See id. at 2539 (plurality opinion).
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writings collectively, we have no clear resolution of that question, in
part because there was no majority opinion. But more troubling still,
even if the nine Justices were to rally around one of the three
approaches offered in their various opinions, there would still be no
coherent resolution of the status the First Amendment affords false
factual assertions. Why? Because none of the three frameworks
really identifies a workable approach to dealing with false assertions
as a general matter.
In other words, the lack of clarity in Alvarez results not just from
the Court’s fragmentation, but also from the fuzzy and incomplete
quality of the analysis in each of the opinions. Justice Kennedy’s
opinion differentiated between harm-causing lies and non-harmcausing lies as a basis for holding that strict scrutiny governs the
review of the SVA.41 But this is a very ambiguous distinction—who
knows what type or magnitude of harm would suffice to remove a
statute from strict scrutiny under the plurality’s approach? Why,
precisely, is the possible devaluation of military medals—the
concern that motivated Congress to enact the SVA—not a cognizable
or serious enough harm?
Relatedly, Justice Kennedy conceded that whether the regulated
speech is a lie may often be relevant to the First Amendment
analysis, but he does not say how it is relevant.42 Indeed, he does not
seem even to formally take the falsity of the prohibited speech into
account in his application of strict scrutiny to the Act.43 Finally,
Justice Kennedy does not clarify how the regulation of lies that do
(in his judgment) cause harm should be evaluated.44 Do laws
regulating lies ever warrant strict scrutiny? If they warrant some
lower level of scrutiny, what level of review should courts apply?
For example, state law regimes for regulating defamation do not
seem to map onto the strict/intermediate/rational basis scrutiny grid
very well, and yet Justice Kennedy never tries to harmonize his
approach in the SVA case with the First Amendment’s general
treatment of lies in the defamation context.
The primary problem with Justice Breyer’s invocation of
intermediate scrutiny to review the SVA’s prohibition of false
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 2542–51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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statements of fact is that the trigger for invoking that scrutiny seems
so nebulous. The big knock on intermediate scrutiny generally is that
it is too malleable and indeterminate in its application. If the very
basis for invoking it is also a malleable and indeterminate amalgam
of factors (Justice Breyer’s opinion offers only vague intuitions
about the value of particular speech and the generally good reasons
government might have to regulate it as the basis for applying
intermediate level scrutiny to the SVA), then the problem of
subjectivity and unpredictability is exacerbated.
To be clear, we do not necessarily oppose subjecting laws
restricting false statements of fact to intermediate scrutiny. If that
approach is to be adopted, however, such scrutiny should apply to
the entire category of such laws, not just laws directed at those false
statements that strike Justice Breyer as being of particularly low
value, or not just laws that Justice Breyer thinks further important
government interests. In other words, categories and categorical
analysis have served free speech values well, and abandoning
categories in favor of an unstructured, ad hoc assessment of the kind
that Justice Breyer undertakes is problematic (even if Justice Breyer
would end up upholding and striking down most of the same laws we
would under a more structured approach).
The dissent’s position has problems of its own. It asserts that all
lies are unprotected speech and do not really implicate the First
Amendment unless their prohibition does in fact chill protected
speech. But what happens if regulation of lies does chill protected
speech? Should strict scrutiny apply? Courts do not generally
perform a strict scrutiny analysis in the context of defamation, where
the primary free speech concern is about chilling effects. Thus, like
the other opinions, the dissent does not adequately locate this dispute
about false facts in the larger setting of cases—including defamation
cases—in which the Court has grappled with false assertions of fact.
Also, the dissent provides no limiting principle for the review of
regulations of lies that do not chill protected speech.45 The only
check on such laws would then be political accountability, but that is
not an adequate response for many folks when freedom of speech is
at issue.

45. Id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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B. Knox
The First Amendment claim in Knox is quite different from that
involved in Alvarez. In Knox, nonunion state employees invoked the
First Amendment to challenge the way California structures its
relationship with public-sector employee unions.46 In California, as
in many other states, a public-sector bargaining unit may, by
majority vote, elect to create an “agency shop” in which the union is
the collective bargaining agent on behalf of all the employees.
Employees in the unit, whether or not they choose to become fullfledged union members (and they have a choice not to), must pay an
“annual fee to cover the cost of union services related to collective
bargaining (so-called chargeable services).”47 Such chargeable
services do not, and cannot, however, include expenses incurred to
fund the union’s political or ideological projects.48 In Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education,49 and then again in Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson,50 the Court held that the First Amendment
prohibits states from forcing public-sector employees to pay for a
union’s ideological or political activities (as distinguished from the
union’s collective bargaining activities), because some employees
may disagree with the union’s politics.51
Knox focuses on the procedure by which employees who do not
want to pay for a union’s ideological activities can prevent their
contributions to the union from being used for political purposes.52
The actual legal dispute in Knox arose out of an unusual scenario in
which the union not only assessed employees for its regular annual
fee but levied an additional, midyear fee on employees as well. 53 In
June 2005, the affected public-sector union sent its annual fee notice
to all employees within the unit.54 Consistent with procedures set
forth in Hudson, the union estimated that 56 percent of its projected
outlays during the coming year would involve so-called “chargeable”
expenses—that is, expenses related to collective bargaining and other
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012).
Id.
Id.
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2284–85.
Id.
Id. at 2301 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2285 (majority opinion).
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nonpolitical core union activities for which even nonmember
employees could be required to contribute.55 This 56 percent estimate
was based on the actual experience during the previous year. To the
extent that a particular year’s (call it “Year One’s”) estimate of
chargeable expenses is higher than actual expenses end up being, the
following year’s (“Year Two’s”) estimate will be lower because it
will be based on the actual expenditures incurred in Year One,
determined by an audit at the end of Year One. Although this system
involves some imprecision, insofar as employees are (in hindsight)
sometimes billed too much and at other times billed too little for a
particular year, the Court has permitted this rough-and-ready
approach because predicting actual expenditures and allocations with
complete accuracy is impossible.56
Pursuant to the notice required under Hudson (called a “Hudson
notice”) that went out in June, employees who wished not to pay the
44 percent of the total fee amount attributable to expected political
expenses had thirty days to object, and if they met this deadline, they
would have to pay only 56 percent of the total union fees. The fee
notice said that fees were subject to increase without further notice.57
After the thirty-day objection period had lapsed, the union sent
out another fee notice, proposing a temporary (that is, one-year ) 25
percent increase in employee dues, which the union titled an
“Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back
Fund.”58 The proposal stated that union needed the money to “help
achieve the union’s political objectives in the special election and the
upcoming November 2006 election.”59 The proposal specifically
stated that the monies raised by the “temporary” 25 percent increase

55. Id.
56. Id. at 2301 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The special election involved, in particular, two contentious ballot measures:
Propositions 75 and 76. Id. at 2285 (majority opinion). Ironically, “Proposition 75 would have
required unions to obtain employees’ affirmative consent before charging them fees to be used for
political purposes.” Id. “Proposition 76 would have limited state spending and would have given
the Governor the ability under some circumstances to reduce state appropriations for publicemployee compensation.” Id. The union vigorously opposed both propositions. Id. Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger had called for the special election within which Propositions 75 and 76
were ballot initiatives. Id. Accordingly, with respect to the upcoming November 2006
gubernatorial election, the union’s goal was “to elect a governor and a legislature who support
public employees and the services [they] provide.” Id. at 2286 (alteration in original).
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in dues would be used “for a broad range of political expenses”60 and
not to fund “regular costs of the union.”61 Less than thirty days after
the proposed one-year increase, the union’s general counsel
implemented it.62
Employees who were not members of the union (“nonmember
employees”) were not given the choice of whether to pay the 25
percent increase in dues,63 although the union subsequently permitted
nonmember employees who had filed timely objections in response
to the June 2005 Hudson notice to pay only 56 percent of the oneyear “emergency” assessment. Nonmember employees who opposed
having to pay this assessment to support the union’s “Political FightBack Fund” formed a class and sued.64 Those nonmember employees
who had filed objections to the June 2005 notice argued they should
not have to pay even 56 percent of the temporary assessment because
the entirety of the new assessment was intended to be used for
political, and thus nonchargeable, expenses.65 Those employees who
had not filed objections to, and thus paid the entirety of, the annual
dues levied in June 2005 argued that they should have been given a
separate chance to object to the political expenditures contemplated
by the new assessment. Their argument was based in part on the
notion that their failure to opt out of paying the nonchargeable part of
the regular annual assessment did not necessarily indicate agreement
with the union’s plans concerning the political use to which the
special fund levy was going to be put.66 The district court ruled in the
plaintiffs’ favor, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the plaintiffs sought
and obtained Supreme Court review.67
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the union offered to
provide refunds to all members of the plaintiff class.68 As a result,
the first question the Court had to resolve was whether the dispute
had been rendered moot by virtue of the union’s offer.69 The Court
rejected the notion that the dispute was moot, observing that
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2286.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2286–87.
Id. at 2287.
Id.
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“postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from
review in this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”70 The Court
also reasoned that the case remained live because the union’s refund
notice was allegedly chock-full of “conditions, caveats and
confusions . . . aimed at reducing the number of class members who
claim a refund.”71 Because “the nature of the notice may affect how
many employees who object to the union’s special assessment would
be able to get their money back,” and because “[t]he union was not
entitled to dictate unilaterally the manner in which it [was legally
obligated to] advertise[] the availability of the refund,”72 the
controversy had not died.
Turning to the merits, seven Justices concluded that the
plaintiffs should prevail on their two primary arguments. First, the
Court concluded that employees who had objected in June 2005
should not have had to pay any of the special assessment because the
entire special assessment was being used for nonchargeable matters.
Second, the Court concluded that employees who had not objected in
June 2005 should have been given a separate opportunity to object
the special assessment because the anticipated political expenditures
connected with the special fund might generate disagreement among
at least some of the employees who initially did not opt out of full
payment of the regular annual dues.73 In summary, the Court
concluded that “when a [public] union levies a special assessment or
dues increase to fund political activities [only], the union may not
collect funds from nonmembers who earlier had objected to the
payment of nonchargeable expenses, and may not collect funds from
other nonmembers without providing a new Hudson notice and
opportunity to opt out.”74
Two members of the Court, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg,
would have limited the holding to the above conclusion.75 Yet five
other Justices who agreed with the Court’s judgment—Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—went
further in holding that “when a public-sector union imposes a special
assessment or dues increase, [it] may not exact any funds from
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2293.
Id. at 2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2296.
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nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”76 In other words, in
addition to providing notice, the union must receive a nonmember’s
affirmative consent to opt in before the union can compel special
assessments; the union may not simply rely on the nonmember’s
silence or failure to opt out as a basis for collecting the special
assessment.
The majority’s rationale, if accepted, could call into question the
union’s use of an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, approach as applied
to annual, nonchargeable dues as well; nothing in the majority
opinion explained why an opt-in procedure is constitutionally
required for special assessments but would not be required for annual
assessments. The majority did say that the union’s position would
have required the Court to “go farther” than past cases77—which had
authorized use of an opt-out procedure for annual dues—but it also
said that these past cases “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of
what the First Amendment can tolerate.”78
More ambitiously still, the majority seemed to raise some
questions about whether a public union could compel nonmembers to
pay even chargeable expenses related to collective bargaining.79 The
majority stated that forcing nonmembers to pay anything at all
“represent[s] an ‘impingement’ on [their] First Amendment rights.”80
The Court went on to state that the “primary purpose”81 of allowing
unions to collect fees from nonmembers—the desire “to prevent
nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the
employment benefits obtained by the union’s collective bargaining
without sharing the costs incurred”—is one that is “generally
insufficient to overcome First Amendment concerns”82 and that cases
upholding the requirement that nonmembers pay for chargeable
expenses “represents something of an anomaly.”83 Nonetheless, the
majority said it was not going to “revisit today whether the Court’s

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (majority opinion).
Id. at 2291.
Id.
Id. at 2293.
Id. at 2284.
Id. at 2289.
Id.
Id. at 2290.
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former cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First
Amendment rights at stake.”84
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, indicated
that he would have upheld the union’s actions in this case.85 Like the
two concurring Justices, he chided the majority for reaching out and
speaking on the important opt-out versus opt-in question for special
assessments (and perhaps also for annual dues) given that that issue
had not been fully argued.86 He also concluded that the objecting
nonmembers had no legitimate gripe at all in this case (even though
they had not been permitted to opt out of nonchargeable expenses
associated with the special assessment), largely because of the
union’s need to operate efficiently.87 True, the union’s mode of
collecting monies from members and nonmembers and allowing
nonmembers to opt out of nonchargeable expenses just once a year
may result in some objectors having their monies used temporarily
for political purposes with which they disagree. Such imperfections,
however, are offset by the system’s “administrative virtue”88 and
efficiency for the union and for workers. By basing each year’s
assessment on the previous year’s allocation track record, even
though the previous year may be an imperfect predictor of the
present year, and by limiting the time window during which
individuals can opt out , the system in place gives “workers reliable
information [and] advance notice of next year’s payable charge.”89 It
also “gives nonmembers a ‘reasonably prompt’ opportunity to
object”90 and frees the union from having to predict with great
accuracy what the next year’s outlays will look like.

84. Id. at 2289.
85. Id. at 2299 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2306.
87. See id. at 2301.
88. Id. (“Normally, what the objecting nonmembers lose on the swings they will gain on the
roundabouts.”).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2301–02.
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II. ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN RELATION TO
OTHER MAJOR RULINGS OF RECENT YEARS
IN DIFFERENT DOCTRINAL AREAS
A. A “Slippery” Summer Day
The Alvarez opinion was handed down on June 28, 2012 the
very same day as the opinion in the year’s most-watched case:
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,91 which
addressed the challenges to Obamacare.92 Sebelius cast large
shadows over everything else in the Term that it dominated. Indeed,
it is not an exaggeration to say that the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
dispute was—in terms of the number of people affected, the amount
of money involved, and the symbolic, political, and institutional
stakes on the line—bigger than all the other seventy-some cases the
Court decided this year put together.93
The Court issued many holdings in Sebelius, one of which was
that the Commerce Clause could not be a valid basis for
Obamacare’s so-called “individual mandate” provision because
Congress was requiring participation in, rather than “regulating,”
commercial activity.94 No one seemed to doubt that the healthcare
and healthcare insurance markets involved true interstate commercial
problems.95 After all, insurance and healthcare providers are usually
national, or at least regional, operations. Quite regularly, folks who
cross state lines get sick and must be cared for away from home, and
people are often unable to relocate to another state for fear of losing
their employer-based coverage. Nor did anyone really dispute that
the individual mandate was sincerely motivated by, and closely
related to, the regulation of these interstate markets and interstate

91. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
92. Id. This Supreme Court issue contains two articles that discuss Sebelius in depth. Brietta
Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 541 (2013); Jonathan D. Varat, Supreme
Court Foreword, October Term 2011: Federalism Points and the Sometime Recognition of
Essential Federal Power, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 411 (2013).
93. Vikram David Amar & Akhil Reed Amar, Chief Justice Roberts Reaches for Greatness,
L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/01/opinion/la-oe-amar-robertssupreme-court-20120701.
94. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–48 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
95. See id. at 2572–77 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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spillover effects.96 Those two conclusions would ordinarily be
sufficient to justify the exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.97
But the problem, suggested by Chief Justice Roberts and the
four Justices (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) in the
joint dissent, was the slippery slope they saw in a congressional
mandate requiring individuals to buy something.98 It raised red flags
that Congress was not just regulating existing commercial
transactions, but rather compelling previously inactive individuals to
engage in commercial activity.99 If the federal government can
require each person to buy health insurance, what can’t it force
people to purchase? Both at oral argument and in their opinions,
these Justices seemed worried: Would Congress also be able to force
people to buy cell phones, broccoli, or burial services?100 If the Court
were to permit Congress to compel people to purchase goods or
services, the resulting freefall would have only one conceivable
endpoint—a world in which there are no limits to the federal
government’s Commerce Clause power to regulate the lives of all
Americans.101
This slippery slope concern did not originate at oral argument.
As one prominent challenger to the ACA, Randy Barnett, had put the
point in an earlier essay:
Congress can mandate individuals do virtually anything at
all on the grounds that the failure to engage in economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
Therefore, [a theory that permits the healthcare law] would
effectively obliterate, once and for all, the enumerated

96. Vikram David Amar, Obamacare and the Misguided Criticism of “Liberal Law
Professors” Who Defend It, JUSTIA (June 7, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/07/
obamacare-and-the-misguided-criticism-of-liberal-law-professors-who-defend-it.
97. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
98. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–44 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2587 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–44 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2591 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
101. See, e.g., id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
citation omitted) (“Underlying the Chief Justice’s view that the Commerce Clause must be
confined to the regulation of active participants in a commercial market is a fear that the
commerce power would otherwise know no limits. The joint dissenters express a similar
apprehension.”).
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powers scheme that even the New Deal Court did not
abandon.102
We understand the need for courts to have adequate doctrinal
tools available to keep Congress within some constitutional bounds
in exercising its Commerce Clause power or other national powers
recognized by the Constitution. But while we think courts should not
abdicate a robust role in policing the boundaries of federalism, we
also think that judges should use tools that are of the right shape and
size for the job. And as we have written before,103 we are struck by
the fact that in the dispute over the mandate, none of the Justices in
the majority even acknowledged, let alone dealt with, the fact that
constitutional doctrine is already poised on equally treacherous
slopes in interpreting the Commerce Clause, and that the Court has
demonstrated that it has plenty of pitons available to arrest any slide
into the abyss of limitless federal power. The slippery slope danger
has been present in Commerce Clause doctrine for the past fifty
years,104 and the mandate does not create additional slopes that are
any more dangerous than those the Court has already been dealing
with for decades. In other words, there is no persuasive basis for
thinking that the individual mandate will create a steeper or more
slippery slope—one that is less susceptible to judicial or political
handholds and footholds—than those hazards we live with that exist
under current doctrine.
To understand this point, it is useful to remember that the Court
has already determined that Congress has the authority to prohibit
people from possessing things under the Commerce Clause.105 Just
seven years ago in Gonzales v. Raich,106 the Court held that the
federal government can ban the possession of marijuana.107 It did not
matter in Raich how a person obtained the marijuana, how much he
102. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 607 (2010).
103. See, e.g., Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Not-So-Slippery Slope, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2012, at A19; Vikram David Amar, The High Court Needn’t Worry About Sliding Downhill,
JUSTIA (Apr. 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/11/the-high-court-neednt-worry-aboutsliding-downhill.
104. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616–17, 2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and its
ability to regulate current conduct based on anticipated future activity).
105. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
106. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
107. Id. at 9.

510

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:491

or she possessed, or whether he or she planned to consume it rather
than sell it. Possession itself was punishable.108
As we observed before the Sebelius ruling came down (and as
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissenting opinion in Sebelius),109 the
holding in Raich would seem to put us on hazardous ground. Does
Raich mean that Congress can also ban the possession of cars,
televisions, clothes, the tomatoes you grow in your garden, or the
broccoli in your refrigerator? If the federal government can ban the
possession of all goods, hasn’t it become all powerful?
The Court has provided some answers to that question already,
by denying the premise. Even though the federal government might
ban possession of some things at some times, the government’s
power in this regard is not unlimited.110 As Justice Scalia observed in
his concurring opinion in Raich, the possession of marijuana in
particular can be punished because such penalties are necessary to
carry out a comprehensive regulatory scheme—the Controlled
Substances Act—that governs a robust and interstate market in
drugs.111 Without that comprehensive regulatory scheme as an
anchor and a clear tie-line connecting the ban on possession to the
regulation of the market in illicit drugs, the ban on marijuana
possession would exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.112
Of course, such an argument cuts in favor of, not against, the
individual mandate in the healthcare reform law. The ACA is a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing interstate commerce,
and the individual mandate plays an important role in furthering that
regulatory framework. In other words, upholding the mandate in the
ACA does not mean upholding any and every random, hypothetical
mandate a crazy Congress might enact, even assuming that such a
rogue Congress could survive in office.
Consider another example: No one doubts that under current
doctrine the government can often regulate ongoing economic
activity—the sale and purchase of goods and services. Once people
enter commerce as producers, sellers, or buyers, the government can

108. Id. at 22.
109. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost any power looks dangerous”).
110. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 35–36 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 39–40.
112. Id.
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regulate their economic transactions and activities. This authority is
widely accepted. But think about the slippery slopes it creates.
Let us return to broccoli, the commodity of choice during the
oral arguments. Congress might, instead of requiring the purchase
and consumption of broccoli, try to prohibit grocery stores from
selling any vegetable—or even any food—other than broccoli. Or it
might require people to purchase broccoli as a condition of
purchasing other food, or other goods or services. Can Congress pull
us down this cliff? If so, then who cares whether Congress can
compel specific purchases to be made directly? It can effectively
compel people to buy designated goods by regulating or prohibiting
consumer decisions to purchase other things.
Happily, we do not think the American people have cause for
serious concern here either. Some commercial regulations would
lack the constitutionally required minimal rationality. In the
extremely unlikely event that Congress conditioned the purchase of,
say, cars on the purchase of broccoli, the law would fail even a
deferential rational basis review by courts. Moreover, some
connections between a particular piece of a law and the larger
comprehensive scheme regulating commerce that justifies
congressional attention in the first place are simply too attenuated to
be upheld as constitutional.
The key point here is that these slippery slopes already exist. We
have been standing on them for years under long-accepted
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, and we have held our
position without tumbling into the crevasse of unlimited federal
regulatory authority.113
113. None of this is to say that attenuation is the only device the Court has—or should have—
to keep Congress in check. Not all congressional mandates are constitutionally permissible
simply because they advance some otherwise legitimate federal goal in a direct and nonattenuated way. The Constitution itself, in some of its provisions and doctrines, prevents
Congress from coercing certain kinds of action. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of
troops in private homes during peacetime, the Fifth Amendment prevents government from
mandating self-incrimination and the surrender of property without just compensation, and the
First Amendment prohibits government from mandating that individuals be vessels for
government speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I, III. The Supreme Court has held in the so-called
anticommandeering cases, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992), and Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997), that federalism principles prohibit Congress from
mandating that state governments exercise their regulatory power on behalf of federal goals. On
the other hand, the federal government can mandate taxes and jury and military service, among
other things, even if the individuals so mandated are not doing anything that serves as the
predicate for being subject to such mandates. See Vikram Amar, Assessing the Reasoning of the
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Given that they failed to address, let alone refute, the strong
arguments against an asserted slippery slope problem in Sebelius, the
five Justices in the Commerce Clause majority might be expected to
be very open to embracing meaningful slippery slope arguments in
other cases. And yet in Alvarez, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas
(60 percent of the Obamacare Commerce Clause majority) have
virtually nothing to say to the other Justices who (plausibly) wonder
where Congress’s power to proscribe false statements would end if,
as the dissent insisted, all lies are unprotected speech. The dissent in
Alvarez merely states:
This concern is likely unfounded. With very good reason,
military honors have traditionally been regarded as quite
different from civilian awards . . . . In any event, if the
plurality’s concern is not entirely fanciful, it falls outside
the purview of the First Amendment . . . . The safeguard
against such laws is democracy, not the First Amendment.
Not every foolish law is unconstitutional.114
Now we ask: Is a law proscribing additional categories of false
statements (if false statements are held to be outside the
Constitution’s protection) more or less likely to be enacted than a
law requiring the purchase of broccoli or many other goods and
services (if the federal government’s power were to be upheld in the
Obamacare cases under the Commerce Clause)? Justice Alito’s
dissent in Alvarez states that legislatures have traditionally regarded
military awards as special.115 But recent federal and state history
suggest that legislatures also view the way the healthcare and health

Eleventh Circuit Opinion Striking Down Obamacare, JUSTIA VERDICT (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/19. The question then becomes, when is a mandate that would in
fact promote a legitimate end nonetheless be constitutionally problematic? Although no simple
line can be drawn to connect all the dots, it is noteworthy that with respect to those mandates that
are acknowledged to be constitutionally impermissible, generally speaking, the individual or
entity being mandated is not contributing to the problem Congress is trying to solve in any
distinctive way, or in a way that explains the extent of the mandate. For example, in the anticommandeering cases, the states that were commandeered were themselves not in any way
standing as an obstacle to Congress’s ability to otherwise implement its regulatory objectives. See
Amar, supra note 113. They were, simply put, not part of the problem Congress was trying to fix,
but instead had simply declined to be the solution that Congress wanted them to be. The free
riders to whom the Obamacare mandate was directed are not outside bystanders to the problem
that the government seeks to solve. They are part of the problem.
114. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2565 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2557–58.
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insurance markets operate as special. (Indeed, the Court so held in
the Medicaid portions of the ruling.)116
If legislatures do begin to go down the slippery slope in either
context, which slide would be harder to stop? As noted above, in the
Commerce Clause setting, the Court has already developed tools—
like the requirement of comprehensive regulation of a true interstate
market to which the law in question is proximately related—to arrest
inevitable freefall. Where are the similar ropes and cables in First
Amendment doctrine once heightened scrutiny of any rigor is
rejected (as the dissent would have it)? The dissenters in Alvarez
point to political checks against government abuse, but is there
reason to think that additional punishments of false speech are likely
to generate more intense and broad-based political blowback than
would congressional requirements mandating more purchases by
consumers?
An obsession with complete consistency may be the hobgoblin
of little minds, but flagrantly inconsistent methodology in major
cases decided the same day cannot be the answer either.
B. Of Free Riding, Manipulative Mootness, and Union Clout
Knox preceded Alvarez and Sebelius by a week, but it too shared
deep methodological connections with the healthcare ruling. We
focus here on the part of the majority opinion in Knox suggesting that
nonmember employees may very well have a winning First
Amendment argument against forced payment of even so-called
chargeable expenses—those relating to the collective-bargaining
activities by the union that presumably improve wages, benefits, and
working conditions for all employees. The same concern about
deterring free riders lay at the heart of the so-called mandate
provision in the ACA; individuals who knew that insurance
companies could not reject their applications for policies after the
onset of sickness or injury, because of the ACA’s ban on so-called
preexisting condition discrimination, would have every incentive to

116. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (“We have no need
to fix a line. . . . It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond
it.”); see also id. at 2661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The question whether a law enacted under
the spending power is coercive in fact will sometimes be difficult, but where Congress has plainly
‘crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion,’ . . . a federal program that coopts
the States’ political processes must be declared unconstitutional.”).
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wait until they had serious health problems before obtaining
coverage and paying premiums.117
It is important to recognize that in both these cases, the Court’s
concerns with the government’s attempts to resolve these problems
are limited to those situations in which the government acts through
private agents and businesses to further public goals. There is no
Commerce Clause issue when government extends Medicare or
creates some other public healthcare system and taxes the general
public to support it. Nor does the First Amendment prohibit
government from exacting fees or taxes from employees—even if
those funds are eventually used by government to subsidize unions’
collective bargaining efforts.118
As Professor Mike Dorf has explained crisply, there is a
similarity between the reasoning in Knox and Sebelius, but one that is
troubling:
The five Justices in the Knox majority were the same five
who voted that the Affordable Care Act’s so-called
individual mandate could not be sustained under the
Commerce Clause because Congress supposedly lacks the
authority to mandate purchases of insurance in the private
sector . . . .
. . . In Knox, the majority hinted that in the future, it
may invoke the First Amendment to deny government the
ability to authorize agency shops in which unions charge
non-members for free-riding on their bargaining activities.
In the health care case, the same five conservative Justices
(including Chief Justice Roberts, on this point), said that the
Commerce Clause forbade Congress from mandating
health-insurance purchases as a means of preventing
currently healthy people from free-riding on the premiums
that are being paid by others who now have insurance.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119 (2011).
118. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (“Citizens may challenge
compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government
speech.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 258 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell in Abood explained that in First Amendment cases dealing with compelled dues
from nonunion employees, “[s]upport of a private association is fundamentally different from
compelled support of government . . . . [T]he reason for permitting the government to compel the
payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the government is
representative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 258 n.13.
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Yet the consistency that was exhibited by the Court’s
conservatives in Knox and the health care case only deepens
the mystery, because it suggests that these Justices are
deeply committed to a principle that is not only difficult to
justify, but upon scrutiny, not at all conservative: The
principle that it is better (so far as the Constitution is
concerned) for government to achieve its aims through
government programs [like broadly based taxation and the
direct provision of public services, all of which are
constitutionally permissible] than to achieve them through
the private sector and private organizations.119
Moving beyond Sebelius, we see important connections between
Knox and other major contemporaneous cases at the Court. Consider
the mootness holding in Knox regarding the imperfect offer of a
refund made by the union. Here the Knox majority concluded that
“postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from
review in this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”120 This
observation very well might have been calculated to send a message
to litigants in the case that loomed over the 2012–2013 Term, the
challenge to race-based affirmative action in Fisher v. University of
Texas.121 The white plaintiff in Fisher (who was originally one of
two plaintiffs but was the only one left by the time Supreme Court
review was sought) unsuccessfully applied to the University of Texas
at Austin (UT) for admission as a freshman.122 She then filed suit in
federal court challenging UT’s race-based admissions criteria, but at
the same time enrolled in another college.123 In her complaint, she
asked for a declaratory judgment that UT’s race-based admissions
policies violate the U.S. Constitution; an injunction directing UT to
consider admitting her without regard to race (on the premise that
she would transfer to UT if admitted); and money damages “in the
form of” (rather than “including, but not limited to” or something
similar to that formulation) a refund of her admissions application
119. Michael C. Dorf, How a Recent Supreme Court Case About Labor Unions
Foreshadowed the Obamacare Ruling, JUSTIA (July 16, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/07/
16/how-a-recent-supreme-court-case-about-labor-unions-foreshadowed-the-obamacare-ruling.
120. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (citing City News &
Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 283–84 (2001)).
121. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
122. Id. at 217 n.3.
123. Id.
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fee, on the theory that her application had not been processed fairly
and therefore she was entitled to get her money back. 124 But there
was a big wrinkle. Because it took almost two years for Fisher’s case
to be resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(which ruled in UT’s favor on the merits) and given that she was a
senior at Louisiana State University at the time certiorari was
granted, she was no longer interested in transferring to UT.
Therefore, her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were no
longer live; in legal parlance, they were moot. But what about her
small monetary refund claim (for a sum total of roughly $100)? In
opposing Supreme Court review, UT asserted that if the Justices
were to grant review, UT could simply offer to refund the $100,
thereby mooting the damages claim as well.125 So, argued UT, it
would be a waste of time for the Court to grant review, only to have
to dismiss the case before deciding it.126
The Court nonetheless granted review, and UT apparently never
followed through on its threat to tender a refund. The university may
have been waiting until Knox came down in the summer of 2012. In
light of what the Court held in Knox, UT might have thought better
of even trying to tender money in light of the Court’s reluctance to
allow late-stage procedural maneuvering by one party to “insulate”
alleged unconstitutional conduct from judicial review.127
Finally, consider Knox alongside another blockbuster case of
recent years—Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.128
Recall that in Citizens United, the Court freed not just corporations
but also labor unions from regulations that limited their ability to
spend money on national political campaigns.129 Some observers
124. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 2, Fisher,
645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS), 2008 WL 7318510, at ¶ 101.
125. See Brief in Opposition at 21, Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 6146835,
at *21.
126. Id. at *22.
127. For more analysis of this mootness issue and the ways the Court could deal with this
kind of situation, see Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative
Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77 (2012).
128. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
129. Although the Court in Citizens United focused on the question of whether it violates the
First Amendment for the government to ban independent election expenditures by corporations,
the majority’s opinion clearly applies with equal force to labor unions. The Court described at
length and with approval earlier cases casting doubt on laws restricting the political expenditures
of unions. See id. at 900–03. More important, the Court insisted that it was returning to the
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may have expected that union money and corporate money would
tend to counteract each other. But to the extent that Knox weakens
public-sector unions (which make up a large percentage of all
unions) by requiring opt-in versus opt-out procedures for
nonchargeable expenses, and by conferring rights to would-be free
riders to avoid paying even for chargeable offenses (if the Court
should take those two steps it intimated), then the real-world
meaning and effect of Citizens United could be altered in nontrivial
ways.
III. ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN A
LARGER FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE
In both Knox and Alvarez, the First Amendment claimant won;
the real question the Court grappled with in each case was how wide,
doctrinally speaking, the victory should be.130 In Knox, the real
division among the Justices is over how far beyond the narrow First
Amendment win the Court should go in foreshadowing further
victories for nonmembers who feel their expressive autonomy rights
are being impinged by having their monetary contributions used in
ways or by institutions with which they may disagree. 131 And in
Alvarez, the big question left unresolved is whether bans on even
untruthful speech will be subject to (nearly always fatal) strict
scrutiny on a categorical basis (as the plurality suggests), or instead
whether particular regulations of certain kinds of untruthful speech
will be subject to a more ad hoc—but nonetheless toothy—
intermediate scrutiny standard, as favored by the concurring
Justices.132
In this crucial, bottom-line “First Amendment-claimants-have-agood-chance-of-winning” way, 2011-2012 is far from an exceptional
Term. For over two decades, expressive autonomy and the First
Amendment’s Speech Clause have been the darlings of the Court.
Numbers can help tell this remarkable story. Since 1992, the
Supreme Court has invoked the Speech Clause to invalidate federal,
state, or local laws and regulations in more than fifty cases,
reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1972), which rejected the argument for expenditure
limits for both unions and corporations. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–12.
130. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion); Knox v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
131. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277.
132. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (plurality opinion).
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averaging close to three cases each year, a substantial number given
the Court’s small yearly docket of between seventy and eighty cases
for most of that period. But a quantitative inquiry tells only part of
the story.133 We find it particularly noteworthy that First Amendment
claims grounded in expressive autonomy rights are not simply
winning but that they are prevailing over—and requiring significant
sacrifices of—other values that traditionally have enjoyed high
esteem in our legal, social, and constitutional traditions. Knox, for
instance, thrusts aside the efficient functioning of labor unions—
important institutions in the nation’s economic and political
development throughout the twentieth century—in favor of each
individual nonmember’s maximal opportunity to avoid subsidizing
potentially disagreeable political activity.134 As Justice Breyer’s
dissent observes, the choice of opt-in over opt-out in the context of
nonchargeable expenses (and the requirement of additional Hudson
notices when any supplemental fees are imposed during a year) has
significant implications for the level of resources public-sector
unions will enjoy to pursue all of their activities.135 The Court was
willing to sacrifice the interests on the union side of the balance
without even seeking briefing on the practical effects of additional
notice and the codification of opt-in procedures on union
activities.136 More ominous still, for those who believe that unions
perform valuable functions in our markets and our politics, is the
Court’s intimation that nonmembers may be constitutionally entitled
to avoid paying even chargeable fees.137 As noted earlier, such a
regime would create a substantial free-rider problem, and produce
potentially devastating damage to union finances.138

133. The exact number of Speech Clause invalidations depends upon whether one counts
cases in which other constitutional provisions might also be invoked by the Court, among other
factors, but the average of around three cases per Term, based on the authors’ review of all the
cases handed down during the past two decades, is workable for these purposes. The Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review keeps a list of these cases on file.
134. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288–99.
135. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288–99 (plurality opinion).
138. See Dorf, supra note 119 (“[S]uppose that the Supreme Court were eventually to rule
that unions may not even charge non-members for collective bargaining activities. Any individual
worker might then decide that it is not in his interest to join the union, because he will still benefit
from whatever favorable terms the union negotiates. Let somebody else pay for it, the free rider
says. . . . Free riding is not simply a fairness problem. Once enough people decide to free ride, the
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In Alvarez, the U.S. military—another institution even more
deeply embedded in American history than unions—loses in a case
where the First Amendment challenger concedes that punishing him
would not chill anyone else’s worthwhile speech.139 As Justice
Alito’s dissent points out, the majority’s suggestion (both the
plurality and the concurrence make this suggestion) that government
counterspeech is the best way to deal with scoundrels like Mr.
Alvarez and the damage he and those like him may do to military
honor does not work in many instances, because the government may
not have the information it needs to affirmatively compile and
publicize lists of all recipients of military awards.140 And the
plurality’s rejoinder that in such instances prosecution under the
SVA would not help in any event141—because without verifiable
information, prosecution is impossible—is logically flawed; there
may be plenty of instances in which the government could prove that
a person is lying about receipt of a military honor (say, by proving
that the liar was in another line of work or in another country during
the time he allegedly earned the honor), even if the government does
not have enough information to proactively produce and post lists of
all medal recipients during that time period. To the extent that
criminal prosecution (or its threat) would decrease the incidence of
individuals being able to “get away” with their lies, and thus reduce
the dignitary harm caused to legitimate medal winners, the nontrivial
costs to the military and the government of not having that tool
available should be assigned some meaningful weight.
To see the extent to which modern expressive autonomy has
eclipsed these and other important values, we must look not just to
this past year but also to recent years preceding it. Staying in the
military context, Snyder v. Phelps,142 decided a year before Alvarez,
illustrates another loss of military interests to free speech values.
Indeed, the plurality in Alvarez began its analysis by observing that
“[t]his is the second case in two Terms requiring the Court to
consider speech that can disparage, or attempt to steal, honor that
people who would otherwise be inclined to pay their fair share begin to feel like suckers; they too
may refuse to pay; and the underlying collective good goes away.”).
139. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2563–64 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2559–60.
141. Id. at 2550 (plurality opinion) (“[I]n cases where public refutation will not serve the
Government’s interest, the Act will not either.”).
142. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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belongs to those who fought for this Nation in battle.”143 What the
plurality did not mention here was that both times military interests
were trumped by expressive autonomy.144
We are not arguing that Snyder reached the wrong result; indeed
we believe the case was correctly decided. But we do think that the
Court did not discuss the competing values at stake in a way that will
help it make good decisions in future cases when well-conceived
efforts to protect military and other funeral mourners—the setting of
Snyder—clash with the interests of protestors.
In Snyder, the father of a marine killed in Iraq obtained a multimillion dollar intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) jury
verdict based on picketing—in three public locations not far from his
son’s funeral—by members of the Westboro Baptist Church.145 The
church members held up signs expressing messages such as “God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t
Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead
Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,”
“You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.”146 The Court, by an
8–1 vote (with Justice Alito dissenting), overturned the tort liability
judgment in favor of the grieving father in an opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts that provided free speech protection to the picketing
in a “narrow” holding “limited by the particular facts before us.”147
These controlling facts included the following:
The church had notified the authorities in advance of
its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the
picketers complied with police instructions in staging their
demonstration. The picketing took place within a 10–by
25–foot plot of public land adjacent to a public street,
behind a temporary fence . . . . That plot was approximately
1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held.
Several buildings separated the picket site from the
church . . . . The Westboro picketers displayed their signs
for about 30 minutes before the funeral began and sang
hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion).
See id.; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1207.
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1220.
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entered church property or went to the cemetery. They did
not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence
associated with the picketing . . . .
The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of
the picket site. Although Snyder [the father bringing suit]
testified that he could see the tops of the picket signs as he
drove to the funeral, he did not see what was written on the
signs until later that night, while watching a news broadcast
covering the event.148
Under these circumstances, the Court rejected liability,
observing that
[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding
Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on
whether that speech is of public or private concern, as
determined by all the circumstances of the case . . . .
. . . The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates
to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than
matters of “purely private concern.” . . . While [the]
messages [on the placards] may fall short of refined social
or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the
political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are
matters of public import.149
We think the Court was wrong to focus on the question of
whether the content of the picketers’ speech constituted a matter
of public or private concern. 150 Other factors should have been the
focus of the Court’s explanation of its result. These factors
include the location of the protests about one thousand feet from
the funeral service. 151 Relatedly, the protestors’ messages were not
visible to the mourners when they entered or left the church where
the service was held. 152 The protestors complied with police
directions as to where they could stand and hold their signs. 153 The
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1215–17.
See id. at 1215–19.
Id. at 1213.
See id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1213.
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protest was directed to the public at large. 154 This was public
discourse—it was not speech exclusively, or even primarily,
directed at a target audience.
Since all of these conditions concerning the protest were present,
it is not clear that the question of whether their speech related to a
matter of public or private concern should be relevant in this kind of
a case. Assume a speaker strongly dislikes one of his colleagues at
work. The speaker stands on a soapbox in a public park and states
that his colleague is a horrible person who should be sent to hell
when he dies. This is mean-spirited private speech, but as long as it
is not defamatory we would think it is constitutionally protected—at
least if it is addressed to a public audience and expressed in a
location some distance away from the place where the maligned
colleague lives and works.
Now assume that Westboro Baptist Church members placed
telephone calls to the home of parents of a soldier killed in the line of
duty immediately before and after the funeral service for their son or
daughter. Assume further that the church members expressed exactly
the same messages that were depicted on the protestors’ signs at
issue in the Snyder case—messages that the Supreme Court
characterized as addressing matters of public concern. As we
maintained in an earlier article, there is a strong argument that such
phone calls could and should be sanctioned as telephone
harassment.155 Similarly, the antiabortion messages communicated
by residential picketers in Frisby v. Schultz156 were also considered
speech on a matter of public concern.157 Yet the picketers’ expressive
activity there could lawfully be restricted because it “inherently and
offensively intrude[d] on residential privacy” and had a “devastating
effect . . . on the quiet enjoyment of the home.”158 Thus, in particular
cases, when, where, and how speech is communicated may be more
154. See id. at 1218 n.4 (“The fact that Westboro conducted its picketing adjacent to a public
street does not insulate the speech from liability, but instead heightens concerns that what is at
issue is an effort to communicate to the public the church’s views on matters of public concern.
That is why our precedents so clearly recognize the special significance of this traditional public
forum.”).
155. See Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech:
Does the First Amendment Permit Protection Against the Harassment and Commandeering of
Funeral Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 380 (2010).
156. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
157. Id. at 479.
158. Id. at 486.
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important in determining whether the speech can be restricted or
subject to penalty than is the determination that the speech is a matter
of public or private concern. By emphasizing the military/public
policy content of the speech, however, in explaining First
Amendment protection in Snyder, the Court may have sent the wrong
message to legislatures interested in pursuing reasonable time, place,
and manner limits on funeral protestors; may have made lower courts
less likely to see that such laws, even if they are applied to speech on
matters of public concern, are permissible; and thus may have made
it harder to vindicate the interests of the military and the mourners at
funerals.159
Military and mourner protections are far from the only recent
victims of the expressive autonomy juggernaut. Antidiscrimination
laws and norms have also fallen in the First Amendment’s path. The
5–4 ruling in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale160 is a prominent
example. There, the Court upheld the expressive autonomy
entitlement of the Boy Scouts to be exempt from a state law
prohibiting public accommodation entities from discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation.161 Another important constitutional
value—free and fair elections—has also come under pressure from
the First Amendment.162 We speak here, of course, of the famous
Citizens United ruling three years ago that we mentioned earlier, in
which the Court vindicated the First Amendment rights of
corporations (and labor unions, whose victory in Citizens United may
be undermined by their loss in Knox)163 to expend unlimited amounts
of money in support of candidates or causes in federal and state
elections notwithstanding plausible concerns about corruption, the
appearance of corruption, and the unfairness of the electoral playing

159. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. The Snyder Court did observe that the protestors’ “choice
of where and when to conduct [their] picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory
reach—it is ‘subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions’ that are consistent with the
standards announced in this Court’s precedents.” Id. But the Court went on to say that it had “no
occasion to consider how [such a law] might apply to facts such as those before us,” suggesting
that perhaps content-neutral time, place, and manner laws could proscribe the very conduct at
issue in Snyder. Id. Both the wrong-headed suggestion and the related misplaced emphasis on the
nature of the protestors’ message discourage sensible evolution of the First Amendment doctrine
going forward.
160. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
161. Id. at 640.
162. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
163. See Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
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field.164 Nor is Citizens United the only recent case we have in mind
when we say that electoral reform has often been a casualty brought
down by First Amendment warriors. Consider Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s PAC v. Bennett,165 where the Court by a 5–4 vote
(with Chief Justice Roberts writing a majority opinion for himself,
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) invalidated an Arizona
campaign finance law that increased the subsidy available to a
publicly financed candidate based on the amount his self-financed
opponent spent on her own behalf or the amount independent
organizations spent supporting her.166 In some respects, increased use
of publicly financed elections may be the remedy for what some
people think are flaws in the regime Citizens United created. Placing
hurdles in the path of public finance schemes may undermine the
utility of this check on the excesses of privately funded political
power permitted by Citizens United.
Under the Arizona law at issue in Bennett, “candidates for state
office who accept public financing could receive additional money
from the state in direct response to the campaign activities of
privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups.”167 Once a candidate exceeded a set spending limit, a
publicly financed candidate received roughly one dollar for every
dollar spent by an opposing privately financed candidate, up to a
predetermined ceiling.168 The publicly financed candidate also
received, again up to a specified ceiling, roughly one dollar for every
dollar spent by independent expenditure groups to support the
privately financed candidate or to oppose the publicly financed
candidate.169 The Court held that this funding scheme substantially
burdened protected political speech by self-financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups without serving a compelling state
interest and therefore violated the First Amendment.170
Although the speech of the self-financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups was not directly capped or limited
by Arizona’s matching funds provision, those parties contended that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 881–82.
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
Id. at 2829.
Id. at 2831.
Id. at 2813.
Id.
Id.
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the law substantially burdened their political speech in the same way
that speech was unconstitutionally burdened in Davis v. Federal
Election Commission.171 In Davis, the Court struck down “a new,
asymmetrical regulatory scheme” enacted by Congress providing
that if a candidate for the United States House of Representatives
spent more than $350,000 of personal funds on his or her electoral
campaign, the candidate’s opponent would then be permitted to
collect individual contributions up to $6,900 per contributor—three
times the normal contribution limit of $2,300.172 The Court held that
this scheme “burden[ed] [the self-funded candidate’s] exercise of his
First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures of his
personal funds because” doing so had “the effect of enabling his
opponent to raise more money and to use that money to finance
speech that counteract[ed] and thus diminishe[d] the effectiveness of
[the self-funded candidate’s] own speech.”173
The Bennett Court held that “the logic of Davis largely
control[led]” the current case before it.174 Indeed, to the Court, the
differences between Arizona’s regime and that regime struck down
in Davis made the Arizona law worse. First, in Davis, unlike in
Bennett, the opponent of the self-funded candidate was not
guaranteed more money based on what the self-funded candidate
spent—he merely had the opportunity to raise more money.175
Moreover, under the Arizona law in Bennett, additional monies for
an opponent were triggered by expenditures of third parties rather
than just by the self-funded candidate himself, further increasing the
burden on the self-funded candidate.176 The Court then rejected the
two government rationales that were advanced as sufficiently
compelling interests to justify any burden on expression—the
leveling of the playing field among candidates and the desire to
avoid corruption or its appearance.177 As to the former, the Court
reiterated its position that equalizing the resources among candidates
is not a permissible objective of campaign finance laws under the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2817 (citing Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)).
Davis, 554 U.S. at 729.
Id. at 736.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2818.
Davis, 554 U.S. at 736, 738.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2818–21.
Id. at 2807.

526

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:491

First Amendment.178 And as to the latter, the Court noted that selfexpenditures and independent expenditures, unlike campaign
contributions, do not raise the specter of corruption.
Justice Kagan wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, in which she distinguished Davis
from Bennett on the ground that it involved limits on the self-funded
candidate’s ability to raise money himself, rather than increases in
subsidies for the opponent.179 The full meaning of Bennett and Davis
will, of course, depend on how the Court ultimately interprets them.
One possible way to read the majority’s opinion in Bennett is that
explicit, near dollar-for-dollar “matching” subsidies triggered by one
candidate’s funding of political speech is hard to understand as
anything other than an attempt to “level the playing field,” which has
been held to be an impermissible goal under the First Amendment
ever since Buckley v. Valeo.180 Under this reading, more nuanced
public finance schemes that avoid the appearance of equalization and
instead simply give publicly funded candidates an amount of money
adequate to get their messages out, regardless of what others spend,
will remain permissible. A second reading of Bennett is more
ominous for advocates of public financing. Under this reading, the
very essence of public financing schemes is attempted equalization.
As such, all these schemes will increasingly be looked at by the
Court with skepticism.
Consider too another case from the last decade (outside the
context of campaign finance) in which electoral regulation—and the
power of states to experiment in our system of federalism—fell prey
to an arguably overzealous application of free speech principles.181 In
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, five Justices used the First
Amendment to strike down a Minnesota law that prohibited
candidates for judicial office from speaking out on issues of the
day.182
The Minnesota law at issue in White prohibited a candidate for
judicial office, whether an incumbent judge or a non-judge
challenger, from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or
178. Id. at 2825–26.
179. Id. at 2839–41 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
180. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that equalizing the financial resources of the parties is not an
acceptable justification for capping campaign expenditures).
181. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
182. Id. at 788.
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political issues.”183 The prohibition went beyond candidate
“promises” and forbade, for example, a candidate from criticizing a
past court decision and indicating a willingness to consider a
different result in similar cases down the road.184 Strong sanctions
accompanied Minnesota’s prohibition.185 Judicial candidates who
were sitting judges who violated the Minnesota ban were “subject to
discipline, including removal, censure, civil penalties, and
suspension without pay.”186 Lawyers who ran for judicial office and
violated the rule were subject to, among other things, “disbarment,
suspension, and probation” from the practice of law.187
Minnesota argued that it needed to regulate candidate speech to
ensure that the public believes that judges are sufficiently open
minded about important matters that might come before them.188
According to the Court, however, whatever gain in public confidence
the Minnesota law achieved was inadequate to overcome the free
speech interests of the candidates because it is “imperative that
[candidates] be allowed to freely express themselves on matters of
current public importance.”189 Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence
took a similar route, added that an individual’s First Amendment
rights are not surrendered simply because he has thrown his hat into
the election ring.190
The dissenting Justices’ approach was quite different. For them,
this case was not so much about the First Amendment as it was about
states’ rights—in particular, the freedom of states to structure their
judicial selection procedures to promote judiciousness.191 Justice
Stevens and the other dissenting Justices argued that judicial
elections are not like other “political” elections, because “there is a
critical difference between the work of the judge and the work of
other public officials.”192 Judges must be, and must be perceived to
be, impartial and free from politics in a way that legislative and
executive officials are not. Because of this, states must not be put in
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778–79.
See id. at 781–82 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)).
Id. at 793.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 798.
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“an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial elections or having
elections in which anything goes.”193
The majority and the dissent end up in very different places. If
one embraces the majority’s reasoning, states are going to have a
hard time discouraging judicial candidates from speaking their
minds, however irresponsibly. Yet if one heeds the dissent, states
will have a pretty free hand to deter people who want to criticize
existing judicial rulings and doctrines—no matter the First
Amendment costs this might entail. From where we sit, neither of
these destinations seems very attractive.
But there is another place to go—a place where both free speech
and judicial impartiality can be protected, a place where the First and
Tenth Amendments can peacefully coexist, and a place where both
the centrality of anti-incumbent speech in an election and the right of
a state to fill its judiciary with judicious people can be
acknowledged. This middle path is based on two key thoughts. First,
speakers should not be punished for core political and antiincumbent speech. Second, there is no First Amendment right to be a
judge, and it is not unconstitutional punishment to be kept off the
bench for injudicious speech.
In a nutshell, the First Amendment protects one’s right to speak
about the bench, but not to sit on it, and the Tenth Amendment gives
states broad powers to structure state officeholding—especially
judicial officeholding—but it does not give states free rein to censor
and punish free-spirited critics and candidates.
Begin with the second point: It is simply not a punishment that
violates the First Amendment for a state to deny a person high public
office because of the views he or she has expressed. This happens all
the time in the executive branch under the (perfectly constitutional)
system of patronage used to reward party loyalists with plum
government posts.194 There is, in short, a First Amendment right to
be a Democrat, but there is not a First Amendment right to be a
Democrat in a Republican president’s cabinet. Consider also the
selection of judges at the federal level, where the President and the
Senate certainly, and permissibly, may refuse to make someone a
judge because of what that person has said, even though such

193. Id. at 799–800.
194. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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refusals are undeniably “content-based” and indeed “viewpointbased,” and thus might, in other contexts, run afoul of basic First
Amendment principles. A President is perfectly within his rights to
withdraw a judicial nomination if the nominee says injudicious
things. Thus, there is a right to say foolish things, but there is not a
right to both say them and be nominated or confirmed despite them.
If it is not a violation of the First Amendment (and it is surely
not) for the Senate to pass an internal Senate rule saying it will not
confirm to the federal bench anyone who has expressed racist views
in public, then neither is it a violation of the First Amendment for the
Senate to announce that it will not confirm any person who speaks
out “injudiciously” about the current Supreme Court or any other
issues of the day during the confirmation process. We are not saying
the Senate can refuse to consider someone for a judgeship on any
ground at all. The fact that a nominee is African American, for
example, cannot be a disqualifying characteristic because of
constitutional principles rooted in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, among other places. But the content and timing of the
nominee’s expressed views surely can be taken into account without
violating the First Amendment.
A counterargument to our position might run as follows: In
Minnesota, judges are selected not by the governor and state senate,
but by the people in an election. Once Minnesota has turned over the
process of picking judges from government institutions to the people
themselves, the counterargument goes, then surely the state must
allow the people to have access to all relevant information about the
candidates. Perhaps—although pinning down the precise source and
scope of this constitutional intuition is no easy matter. One possible
elaboration might run like this: When a state decides to hold a true
“election” to determine a contest, the voters in that election should
not be constrained in doing their job, lest people be confused or
deceived about what powers they are being given or denied.
Avoiding voter confusion is a laudable objective, and, at some
level, a constitutionally grounded one. But suppose Minnesota
tweaked its process ever so slightly so as to avoid any possible
deception or voter confusion. Suppose, for example, that the state
made crystal clear that the vote of the people was not the final word
but rather only, formally speaking, a strong opinion poll (a “beauty
contest,” in election lingo) that a governmental agency—perhaps a
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special committee of the state senate—should take into account in
making the final decision about whom to appoint to the bench.
Consistent with the Constitution, any state could cut the people out
of the loop altogether and give judicial selection powers entirely to a
governor and a senate who are free to take into account the views
and statements of judicial applicants. Indeed, there is strong Supreme
Court precedent suggesting such state choices are central to the
Tenth Amendment and American federalism.195 Given that this is so,
why should a state not be able to decide to involve the people, but
with less finality?
So long as the final decision is made on grounds (judiciousness)
plainly relevant to the nature of the office (the judiciary), how is the
Constitution violated by this popular “beauty contest” system? Note
that there is no federal constitutional rule that the top vote-getter in a
state judicial election must get the bench seat, the way there is, for
example, a constitutional rule in the Seventeenth Amendment that
the candidate who wins a majority of the statewide vote gets to be
the U.S. Senator.196
Popular-vote “beauty contests” may be unusual nowadays, but
they are certainly not unheard of in American history. Before the
Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for direct popular election
of U.S. Senators,197 many states held “beauty contest” popular
elections that were then used by the state legislatures in their
decisions about whom to elect to the Senate.198 Similarly, in
presidential “elections,” states in the early Republic were free to use
popular-vote “beauty contests” to give the state legislatures
information that legislators could then use to decide whom to send to
the electoral college. And even today, a state could, without violating
the First Amendment, prospectively legislate that it will award its
electoral college votes to the winner of the popular vote in that state
only if that “winner” has, say, participated in state-sponsored debates
or refrained from endorsing racial segregation.199 This is so even
though the First Amendment would forbid truly punishing someone
195. E.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
197. Id.
198. See Vikram Amar, The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional
Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power,
100 GEO. L. J. 237, 237–38 (2011).
199. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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for boycotting a debate or for spewing racist rhetoric at an open
political rally. In short, there is no ultrastrong First Amendment right
to be a president. Or a judge. The right to speak does not encompass
the right to hold either of these jobs.
But isn’t there a presumptive right to ply one’s lawful private
legal practice free from penalty for one’s anti-incumbent political
expressions? And didn’t the Minnesota regime go too far when it
threatened disbarment (and not just ineligibility for the bench) for
any non-incumbent judicial candidate who speaks out too politically
during the campaign? Surely it did, and this was the aspect of the
Minnesota law that should have been stressed by the majority and
was altogether missed by the dissent. When Minnesota not only
denied high government jobs to intemperate speakers, but also
threatened to take away their private livelihoods without clear
evidence that they were unfit to hold those occupations, then the
state’s actions became punitive in a way that the First Amendment
prohibits.
Allowing Minnesota to disbar lawyer critics of incumbent
judges and existing judicial rulings would severely dampen core
political discourse, whether we call the bench-filling process an
“election,” a “selection,” or a “beauty contest.” Punishing private
citizens for speaking out against existing laws and judges is precisely
what the First Amendment is, at its core, designed to prevent. All of
this suggests that if Minnesota passed legislation changing its
election to a “beauty contest” and limiting the consequences of
intemperate speech to judicial ineligibility, then the legislation
should survive First Amendment attack. That much narrower
approach should have been the one the Court took in White—and
should, indeed, have commanded unanimity, as it satisfies the
concerns of all nine Justices. Such an approach also would have
provided a map for other states as they considered revising their own
judicial selection procedures.
Let us now turn to two other historically important values that
have given way to expressive autonomy challenges in the last few
years: (1) parental control over the upbringing of their children and
(2) consumer protections. Regarding parental control, consider
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,200 where a somewhat
200. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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divided Court201 invalidated a California statute that prohibited the
sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors unless accompanied
by a parent purchaser and required the packaging of “violent video
games” to be labeled “18.”202 The California statute covered games
“in which the range of options available to a player includes
killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an
image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a
manner that “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as
a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest
of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is suitable for
minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.”203
Observing that video games qualify for First Amendment
protection, and drawing no meaningful distinction between speech
for adults and speech for children outside the realm of sexual speech,
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court recognized “that it is difficult
to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”204
Scalia went on to remind us that
“as a general matter, . . . government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.” There are of course
exceptions. “From 1791 to the present,” . . . the First
Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “include[d] a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”205
Justice Scalia then continued by noting that “without persuasive
evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may
not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied in the
First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the

201. Five Justices joined the majority opinion and seven concurred in the ruling.
202. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732.
203. Id. at 2732–33 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2006)).
204. Id. at 2733.
205. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2009) (alterations in
original)).
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Government outweigh the costs.’”206 This principle, Justice Scalia
argued, controlled the case at hand.207
To our way of thinking, the Court in Brown, as in Snyder, may
have reached a defensible result in the case at hand, but in doing so
seemed to have fashioned some bad doctrinal principles. As we
explained when we offered written analysis to California legislative
staff while the video game bill was under consideration, California’s
law reached too far. It is hard to argue, for First Amendment
purposes or otherwise, that the state can (or should try to) prohibit a
seventeen-year-old person planning to join the Marines when he
turns eighteen from buying a violent video game unless his mother
accompanies him to the store to purchase the game for him. The
statute’s age cut-off was simply too high.
The Court could have made that point succinctly and noted that
a more carefully tailored law restricting access to violent video
games to children under the age of thirteen or fourteen would have
raised a very different case.208 Unfortunately, the Court did not go
that route. Instead, it insisted that, with the exception of sexually
graphic materials, children have pretty much the same free speech
rights as adults.209 Thus, if adults may access depraved and viciously
violent video games in which women and racial and religious
minorities are slaughtered like animals,210 minors under the age of
eighteen have the same freedom to obtain these materials.
But this constitutional equivalence between adults and children
is very much open to question. Children do not have the same rights
as adults when it comes to voting, having abortions, marrying, or
keeping and bearing arms.211 The reason children do not enjoy the
full panoply of rights guaranteed to adults is that children lack the
experience, maturity, and knowledge to decide how to responsibly
exercise those freedoms.212 Why should the right to free speech be
any different, particularly if legislation is properly directed at
protecting young children?

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 2734 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585).
Id.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011).
Id. at 2760–61.
Id. at 2749–50.
Id. at 2760.
Id. at 2767.

534

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:491

The Brown Court did not adequately answer this question.
Instead, the Court cited language from one case, Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville,213 to support the argument that children and adults have
equivalent First Amendment rights.214 Yet, Erznoznik was
distinguishable from Brown because it did not concern the narrow
issue in Brown of marketing expressive materials to children. Rather,
Erznoznik invalidated a law prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from
showing movies containing nude scenes in order to prevent children
from catching fleeting glimpses of nude images on the screen from
afar.215 We agree with the holding in Erznoznik to the extent that it
correctly recognized that the State cannot childproof the marketplace
of ideas and cannot restrict free speech among adults simply because
the speech might be overheard (or seen) by children. In contrast,
California’s statute in Brown narrowly restricted the direct marketing
of video games to children216 and did not impose limits on adults’
rights to purchase the violent video games for themselves or their
children.
We are not suggesting that determining the free speech rights of
children and the rights of adults who target child audiences is a
simple issue for the courts to resolve. Age matters, and there is a
continuum of rights that grows along with a child’s maturity and
experience. Courts will confront difficult questions about what falls
within the scope of legislative discretion. While we may avoid those
hard questions by providing children the same free speech rights as
adults, avoiding these problems creates others in their place. Does
the fact that Nazis can hold rallies on public streets mean they can
patrol sidewalks in front of elementary schools and recruit children
to attend their meetings? Justice Scalia points out in Brown that a
seventeen-year-old can attend the church of his choice and that
church groups have a free speech right to proselytize our youth.217
Does that mean that any group that identifies itself as religious in
nature can proselytize eight-year-olds and invite them to attend
church meetings without their parents’ permission?

213. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
214. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975)).
215. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 223.
216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1 (West 2006).
217. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 n.3.
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As for consumer protection, consider the Court’s most important
commercial speech case in recent years, Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.218 There, the Court (6–3, with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Kagan, dissenting) struck down a Vermont law restricting the sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing
practices of individual doctors.219 Subject to certain exceptions, the
Vermont statute prohibited such information from being sold,
disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or used for
marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.220 Vermont argued that
its prohibitions safeguarded medical privacy and diminished the
likelihood that marketing would lead to prescription decisions that
are adverse to the best interests of patients and the state.221 The Court
assumed these interests were significant, but it held that Vermont’s
statute must be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny because
speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing is a form of expression
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.222 The
Court concluded the law did not satisfy that standard because of the
imprecise fit between its means and asserted ends.223
Free speech doctrine has been so ravenous in recent years that it
is substantially cannibalizing other clauses in the First Amendment,
particularly the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
In a series of cases beginning with Widmar v. Vincent224 in 1981 and
extending through Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,225 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,226 and Good News Club v. Milford Central School,227 the
Court used the Free Speech Clause to protect religious gatherings
and activities from discrimination. Widmar characterized
discrimination against expressive religious activities as content
discrimination.228 In Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News
Club, however, the Court more aggressively construed
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Id. at 2658–59, 2672.
Id. at 2659.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2668.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
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discrimination against these activities as viewpoint discrimination.229
In perhaps the most forceful assertion of Free Speech Clause
dominance, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez230 four dissenting
Justices asserted that a university policy prohibiting both religious
and secular student groups from discriminating on the basis of
religion in admitting members, while permitting discrimination on
the basis of political belief or affiliation, amounted to
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination against religion.231
This line of authority displaces the Free Exercise Clause as the
primary constitutional vehicle for protecting religious liberty and
simultaneously undermines Establishment Clause constraints on
government promotion of religion. Lamb’s Chapel and Good News
Club, for example, involved discriminatory policies restricting
religious groups’ access to public property for religiously expressive
activities.232 Although Employment Division v. Smith,233 the seminal
free exercise case decided in 1990, sharply limited the scope of free
exercise rights against neutral laws of general applicability, it
reaffirmed the viability of free exercise rights against laws targeting
religion.234 Thus, the discriminatory policies at issue in Lamb’s
Chapel and Good News Club were vulnerable to rigorous review and
invalidation under free exercise doctrine, and the plaintiffs in both
cases raised such claims in their lawsuits.235 Yet, in both Lamb’s
Chapel and Good News, the Court ignored the constitutional
guarantees focusing directly on the protection of religious liberty and
229. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb’s Chapel,
508 U.S. at 394.
230. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
231. Id. at 3009–10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
232. In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court described the issue as follows:
[W]hether, against this background of state law, it violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to
deny a church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for
assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family and child-rearing issues
faced by parents today.
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387. In Good News Club, a private Christian youth organization
named the Good News Club was entitled to use public school facilities so long as the club
received approval from the school. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103. The club’s sponsors
requested permission to hold the club’s weekly meeting in the school’s cafeteria. Id. School
policy prohibited use of the facilities “by any individual or organization for religious purposes,”
and the superintendent denied the club’s request on the basis that the activity was equivalent to
religious worship. Id.
233. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
234. Id.
235. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104.
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elected to resolve both cases on free speech grounds.236 Given the
range of religious practice and activity with an expressive dimension
(such as sermons, prayers, and proselytizing), substituting free
speech for the free exercise of religion dramatically limits the scope
of the latter provision.
In contrast to Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, the
Rosenberger case did not involve restrictions on access to public
property.237 At issue in Rosenberger was a university program that
provided financial subsidies to student groups for various expressive
activities.238 Here again, the university excluded funding for
religiously expressive activities,239 and the Court concluded that the
university’s policies were discriminatory on the basis of viewpoint
and were therefore unconstitutional.240 This step—from
discrimination against religion regarding access to public property to
discrimination in eligibility for government subsidies—was arguably
a substantial one, however. The Court does not typically apply
rigorous review to government decisions to fund some speakers but
not others.241 More importantly, the Establishment Clause imposes
serious constraints on government funding of religious institutions
and activities.242 If the Free Speech Clause were interpreted to
prohibit such discrimination with respect to government funding, it
would fundamentally undercut the key Establishment Clause goal of
prohibiting the government from promoting religion.

236. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111.
237. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843 (1995).
238. Id. at 824.
239. Id. at 824–27.
240. Id. at 835–37.
241. As the Court noted in a free speech subsidy case, Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983), it is hardly a “novel principle[]” to recognize that “a
legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right . . . .” The applicability of this principle to freedom of speech was reaffirmed in Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Here, the Court provided an explicit example to support its
reasoning. “When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage
other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a
program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism or Fascism.”
Id. at 193; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595–98 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that by denying some speakers subsidies provided to others, the
government neither abridges nor suppresses freedom of speech).
242. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (“[T]he subject of religion is one in
which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free
exercise, but opposed to establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or
professions.”).
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The Court’s use of the Free Speech Clause to bulldoze over and
through the religion clauses may have serious costs, and it is unclear
whether the Justices orchestrating this line of authority realize the
doctrinal risks involved. The Free Speech Clause requires the same
rigorous level of review of government regulations whether they
favor or disfavor a particular viewpoint.243 Both forms of viewpoint
discrimination are unconstitutional unless they can pass the Court’s
strict scrutiny test.244 Accordingly, if laws discriminating against
religiously expressive activities are subject to rigorous review, then
laws discriminating in favor of religiously expressive activities must
receive the same rigorous level of review. Such rigorous review
would, however, undermine the constitutionality of numerous laws
accommodating religious beliefs and activities, as well as those
exempting religious individuals and institutions from general
regulations that their secular counterparts are required to obey.
The ramifications of the arguments offered by the dissenting
Justices in the Martinez case are even more disturbing.245 If we are
going to view religion through a free speech prism, rather than an
equal protection framework, many conventional civil rights laws
protecting religious individuals against discrimination may be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge. From an equal protection
perspective, religion is conceptualized as a person’s status or
identity.246 Pursuant to this understanding, it is no more problematic
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, but allow it on the
basis of political belief or affiliation, than it is to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race but allow it on the basis of
political belief and affiliation.
The analysis changes dramatically, however, if we conceptualize
religion as a viewpoint of speech under free speech doctrine. Now
civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion
but not discrimination on the basis of political belief or affiliation
seem to be viewpoint discriminatory on their face. Individuals who
hold and espouse religious beliefs are protected against
243. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) (“[N]o case
has applied any but the most exacting scrutiny to a content or speaker restriction that substantially
tended to favor the advocacy of one point of view on a given issue.” (quoting Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981)).
244. Id.
245. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2989–90.
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discrimination while individuals who hold and espouse nonreligious
beliefs receive no comparable protection.247 Let us be clear that we
are not arguing here that all such civil rights laws are
unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause. We do suggest that
there is a price to pay when free speech doctrine is expanded into
domains that may be more appropriately reserved for analysis under
doctrinal frameworks interpreting other constitutional provisions.
To list some of the many important areas into which First
Amendment doctrine has been extended and the many important
societal and constitutional values over which free speech claims have
prevailed is not to say the Supreme Court has decided all or any of
these difficult disputes incorrectly. Nor is it to say this is the first
time when one provision/theory in the Constitution seems to have
ramified to influence and dominate over other provisions/theories.
Indeed, we see in the modern free speech jurisprudence a
development similar to that which could be said to characterize the
extensive spread and reach of equal protection/antidiscrimination
doctrine and theory during the decades following World War II.248 In
that era, antidiscrimination norms and values derived from an equal
protection foundation did more than simply govern racial
discrimination cases; these norms and values deeply affected
regulation of the electoral process,249 dictated the result in cases
involving federal power to regulate the economy and protect
consumers,250 drove state action doctrine,251 undergirded the right to
travel,252 overrode associational interests,253 infiltrated establishment
clause thinking,254 and indeed strongly influenced much of the
doctrine developed under the Free Speech Clause,255 the provision
247. Id. at 2991.
248. See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV.
146, 146 (1986) (describing the Court’s commitment to equal protection principles as “doctrinal
imperialism” because “the equal protection mode of analysis has come to dominate the
interpretation of many other Clauses of the Constitution” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
249. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
250. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
251. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 717 (1961); Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1948).
252. E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58 (1966).
253. E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983).
254. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984).
255. E.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“Necessarily, then, under
the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not
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that in recent decades seems to have become the dominant
constitutional paradigm.
In terms of constitutional centrality and salience, the First
Amendment in some ways is the new equal protection.

grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial views.”). It is also interesting to note that the idea
and label of “intermediate scrutiny” in content-neutral free speech regulation cases seems to have
been borrowed from equal protection gender classification review.

